But if there is no such single and
general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes
still more difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall
have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this
there be a clear answer, e.g. that the process is demonstration or
division, or some known method, difficulties and hesitations still
beset us-with what facts shall we begin the inquiry? For the facts
which form the starting-points in different subjects must be
different, as e.g. in the case of numbers and surfaces.
First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the
summa genera soul lies, what it is; is it 'a this-somewhat, 'a
substance, or is it a quale or a quantum, or some other of the
remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished? Further,
does soul belong to the class of potential existents, or is it not
rather an actuality? Our answer to this question is of the greatest
importance.
We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts,
and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not
homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or
generically: up to the present time those who have discussed and
investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human
soul. We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can
be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with
animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each of it,
as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the
'universal' animal-and so too every other 'common predicate'-being
treated either as nothing at all or as a later product).
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