The
opinion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen
from the doctrine that a whole must be homogeneous with its parts.
If it is true that animals become animate by drawing into themselves a
portion of what surrounds them, the partisans of this view are bound
to say that the soul of the Whole too is homogeneous with all its
parts. If the air sucked in is homogeneous, but soul heterogeneous,
clearly while some part of soul will exist in the inbreathed air, some
other part will not. The soul must either be homogeneous, or such that
there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not to be found.
From what has been said it is now clear that knowing as an attribute
of soul cannot be explained by soul's being composed of the
elements, and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as
moved. But since (a) knowing, perceiving, opining, and further (b)
desiring, wishing, and generally all other modes of appetition, belong
to soul, and (c) the local movements of animals, and (d) growth,
maturity, and decay are produced by the soul, we must ask whether each
of these is an attribute of the soul as a whole, i.e. whether it is
with the whole soul we think, perceive, move ourselves, act or are
acted upon, or whether each of them requires a different part of the
soul? So too with regard to life. Does it depend on one of the parts
of soul? Or is it dependent on more than one? Or on all? Or has it
some quite other cause?
Some hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks,
another desires.
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