Further,
all animals have the sense for food (for touch is the sense for food);
the food of all living things consists of what is dry, moist, hot,
cold, and these are the qualities apprehended by touch; all other
sensible qualities are apprehended by touch only indirectly. Sounds,
colours, and odours contribute nothing to nutriment; flavours fall
within the field of tangible qualities. Hunger and thirst are forms of
desire, hunger a desire for what is dry and hot, thirst a desire for
what is cold and moist; flavour is a sort of seasoning added to
both. We must later clear up these points, but at present it may be
enough to say that all animals that possess the sense of touch have
also appetition. The case of imagination is obscure; we must examine
it later. Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of
locomotion, and still another order of animate beings, i.e. man and
possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of
thinking, i.e. mind. It is now evident that a single definition can be
given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of figure.
For, as in that case there is no figure distinguishable and apart from
triangle, &c., so here there is no soul apart from the forms of soul
just enumerated. It is true that a highly general definition can be
given for figure which will fit all figures without expressing the
peculiar nature of any figure. So here in the case of soul and its
specific forms.
Pages:
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54