This implies that the sense itself is a 'mean' between any
two opposite qualities which determine the field of that sense. It
is to this that it owes its power of discerning the objects in that
field. What is 'in the middle' is fitted to discern; relatively to
either extreme it can put itself in the place of the other. As what is
to perceive both white and black must, to begin with, be actually
neither but potentially either (and so with all the other
sense-organs), so the organ of touch must be neither hot nor cold.
Further, as in a sense sight had for its object both what was
visible and what was invisible (and there was a parallel truth about
all the other senses discussed), so touch has for its object both what
is tangible and what is intangible. Here by 'intangible' is meant
(a) what like air possesses some quality of tangible things in a
very slight degree and (b) what possesses it in an excessive degree,
as destructive things do.
We have now given an outline account of each of the several senses.
12
The following results applying to any and every sense may now be
formulated.
(A) By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into
itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be
conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax
takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; we say
that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but
its particular metallic constitution makes no difference: in a similar
way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or
sounding, but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is;
what alone matters is what quality it has, i.
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