Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common
sensibles either, i.e. the objects which we perceive incidentally
through this or that special sense, e.g. movement, rest, figure,
magnitude, number, unity; for all these we perceive by movement,
e.g. magnitude by movement, and therefore also figure (for figure is a
species of magnitude), what is at rest by the absence of movement:
number is perceived by the negation of continuity, and by the
special sensibles; for each sense perceives one class of sensible
objects. So that it is clearly impossible that there should be a
special sense for any one of the common sensibles, e.g. movement; for,
if that were so, our perception of it would be exactly parallel to our
present perception of what is sweet by vision. That is so because we
have a sense for each of the two qualities, in virtue of which when
they happen to meet in one sensible object we are aware of both
contemporaneously. If it were not like this our perception of the
common qualities would always be incidental, i.e. as is the perception
of Cleon's son, where we perceive him not as Cleon's son but as white,
and the white thing which we really perceive happens to be Cleon's
son.
But in the case of the common sensibles there is already in us a
general sensibility which enables us to perceive them directly;
there is therefore no special sense required for their perception:
if there were, our perception of them would have been exactly like
what has been above described.
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