So far forth then as it
takes the limit as two' it discriminates two separate objects with
what in a sense is divided: while so far as it takes it as one, it
does so with what is one and occupies in its activity a single
moment of time.
About the principle in virtue of which we say that animals are
percipient, let this discussion suffice.
3
There are two distinctive peculiarities by reference to which we
characterize the soul (1) local movement and (2) thinking,
discriminating, and perceiving. Thinking both speculative and
practical is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the
one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of
something which is. Indeed the ancients go so far as to identify
thinking and perceiving; e.g. Empedocles says 'For 'tis in respect
of what is present that man's wit is increased', and again 'Whence
it befalls them from time to time to think diverse thoughts', and
Homer's phrase 'For suchlike is man's mind' means the same. They all
look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving, and hold
that like is known as well as perceived by like, as I explained at the
beginning of our discussion. Yet they ought at the same time to have
accounted for error also; for it is more intimately connected with
animal existence and the soul continues longer in the state of error
than in that of truth. They cannot escape the dilemma: either (1)
whatever seems is true (and there are some who accept this) or (2)
error is contact with the unlike; for that is the opposite of the
knowing of like by like.
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