e. that of what has been perfected, is different from
movement.
To perceive then is like bare asserting or knowing; but when the
object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a quasi-affirmation or
negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain
is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such.
Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with this: the
faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one
another or from the faculty of sense-perception; but their being is
different.
To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of
perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it
avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without
an image. The process is like that in which the air modifies the pupil
in this or that way and the pupil transmits the modification to some
third thing (and similarly in hearing), while the ultimate point of
arrival is one, a single mean, with different manners of being.
With what part of itself the soul discriminates sweet from hot I
have explained before and must now describe again as follows: That
with which it does so is a sort of unity, but in the way just
mentioned, i.e. as a connecting term. And the two faculties it
connects, being one by analogy and numerically, are each to each as
the qualities discerned are to one another (for what difference does
it make whether we raise the problem of discrimination between
disparates or between contraries, e.
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