Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, mind
and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which calculates means to an end,
i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character
of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to
an end: for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of
mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is
the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a
justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e.
appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a
movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the
object of appetite being it a source of stimulation. So too when
imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.
That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of
appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement-mind and
appetite-they would have produced movement in virtue of some common
character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without
appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is
produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but
appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is
a form of appetite. Now mind is always right, but appetite and
imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any
case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this
object may be either the real or the apparent good.
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