To produce
movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can
be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than
as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the
soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates
movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they
distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find
themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a
sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive
part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties
of desire and passion.
Since appetites run counter to one another, which happens when a
principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only
in beings with a sense of time (for while mind bids us hold back
because of what is future, desire is influenced by what is just at
hand: a pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as
both pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because of
want of foresight into what is farther away in time), it follows
that while that which originates movement must be specifically one,
viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all
the object of that faculty; for it is it that itself remaining unmoved
originates the movement by being apprehended in thought or
imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many.
All movement involves three factors, (1) that which originates the
movement, (2) that by means of which it originates it, and (3) that
which is moved.
Pages:
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115