38. Because all who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them
not. Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in
contemplation greater or less to the understanding, which is the state
of all absent good, and that which, in the received opinion, the
will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by,- I do not see how
it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once
proposed and considered as possible. For, all absent good, by which
alone, barely proposed, and coming in view, the will is thought to
be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but
not infallibly certain, it is unavoidable that the infinitely
greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the
will in all the successive actions it directs; and then we should keep
constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever
standing still, or directing our actions to any other end: the eternal
condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation
of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleasure which we can
propose to ourselves, though we should grant these the more probable
to be obtained: for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the
expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were so that the
greater good in view determines the will, so great a good, once
proposed, could not but seize the will, and hold it fast to the
pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it go
again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts,
as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation
of the mind fixed to that good.
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