Here a man
may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against
the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really of a
nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy or not. For,
when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his
happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him
uneasiness; which determines his will, and sets him at work in pursuit
of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how
it comes to pass that a man may justly incur punishment, though it
be certain that, in all the particular actions that he wills, he does,
and necessarily does, will that which he then judges to be good.
For, though his will be always determined by that which is judged good
by his understanding, yet it excuses him not; because, by a too
hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong
measures of good and evil; which, however false and fallacious, have
the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and
right. He has vitiated his own palate, and must be answerable to
himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal
law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his
ill-ordered choice. If the neglect or abuse of the liberty he had,
to examine what would really and truly make for his happiness,
misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it must be imputed to
his own election.
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