But if it
be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man
would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the
sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human
laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the
sober man for what the mad man did,- thereby making them two
persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English
when we say such an one is "not himself," or is "beside himself"; in
which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first
used them, thought that self was changed; the selfsame person was no
longer in that man.
21. Difference between identity of man and of person. But yet it
is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, should
be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what
is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man.
First, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking
substance; in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.
Secondly, or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial
soul.
Thirdly, or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.
Now, take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible
to make personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness; or
reach any further than that does.
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