For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man
born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man.
A way of speaking which, whoever admits, must allow it possible for
the same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived in
different ages without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.
By the second and third, Socrates, in this life and after it, cannot
be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so
making human identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place
personal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same man
to be the same person. But then they who place human identity in
consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how
they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after
the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and
consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are
agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but
consciousness, (which is that alone which makes what we call self,)
without involving us in great absurdities.
22. But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he
punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never
afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that
walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and
is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it.
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