28. The difficulty from ill use of names. To conclude: Whatever
substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence,
necessarily be the same: whatever compositions of substances begin
to exist, during the union of those substances, the concrete must be
the same: whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence it
is the same: and so if the composition be of distinct substances and
different modes, the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the
difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises
from the names ill-used, than from any obscurity in things themselves.
For whatever makes the specific idea to which the name is applied,
if that idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of anything into the
same and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt
about it.
29. Continuance of that which we have made to he our complex idea of
man makes the same man. For, supposing a rational spirit be the idea
of a man, it is easy to know what is the same man, viz. the same
spirit- whether separate or in a body- will be the same man. Supposing
a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation
of parts to make a man; whilst that rational spirit, with that vital
conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive body,
remains, it will be the same man.
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