17. Relations innumerable, and only the most considerable here
mentioned. And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law,
which, therefore, I call moral relations.
It would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations: it is not,
therefore, to be expected that I should here mention them all. It
suffices to our present purpose to show by these, what the ideas are
we have of this comprehensive consideration called relation. Which
is so various, and the occasions of it so many, (as many as there
can be of comparing things one to another,) that it is not very easy
to reduce it to rules, or under just heads. Those I have mentioned,
I think, are some of the most considerable; and such as may serve to
let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they
are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been
said give me leave to observe:
18. All relations terminate in simple ideas. First, That it is
evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded
on, those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection: so
that all we have in our thoughts ourselves, (if we think of
anything, or have any meaning), or would signify to others, when we
use words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or
collections of simple ideas, compared one with another.
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