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Locke, John

"An Essay Concerning Human Understanding"

e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea,
therefore, can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought
to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for
from all other it is evidently different.
6. Confusion of ideas is in reference to their names. To remove this
difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes
the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must consider,
that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different
enough to be distinguished, that so each sort by its peculiar name may
be marked, and discoursed of apart upon any occasion: and there is
nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names
are supposed to stand for different things. Now every idea a man
has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but
itself; that which makes it confused, is, when it is such that it
may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed
by; the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those
two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to
the one and some of them to the other of those names, being left
out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those
different names, is quite lost.
7. Defaults which make this confusion.


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