That which is
essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it is of this or that
sort: but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the
name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it,
nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real essences of
substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely knowing
what they are; but that which annexes them still to the species is the
nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and cause.
7. The nominal essence bounds the species for us. The next thing
to be considered is, by which of those essences it is that
substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it is
evident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the
name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible,
therefore, that anything should determine the sorts of things, which
we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is designed
as a mark for; which is that, as has been shown, which we call nominal
essence. Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an
animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this
or that sort, but because it has that nominal essence; or, which is
all one, agrees to that abstract idea, that name is annexed to? And
I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears
or speaks any of those or other names of substances, to know what sort
of essences they stand for.
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