That is properly the essence to us, which
determines every particular to this or that classis; or, which is
the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be
else, but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed; and so
has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular
things, as to their general denominations?
9. Not the real essence, or texture of parts, which we know not. Nor
indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end
of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences; because we know
them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge
and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible
ideas which we observe in them; which, however made with the
greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote
from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow,
than, as I said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of
that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward
figure and motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal,
that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the
familiar use of things about us take off our wonder, yet it cures
not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on,
or the iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their make;
and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them.
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