Let us then in discourse put extension for body, and when we would say
that body moves, let us say that extension moves, and see how ill it
will look. He that should say that one extension by impulse moves
another extension, would, by the bare expression, sufficiently show
the absurdity of such a notion. The essence of anything in respect
of us, is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name;
and in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas that make
them up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support and
cause of their union, is always a part: and therefore the essence of
body is not bare extension, but an extended solid thing; and so to
say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and
as intelligible, as to say, body moves or impels. Likewise, to say
that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as to
say a man; but no one will say that rationality is capable of
conversation, because it makes not the whole essence to which we
give the name man.
22. Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of the species we
make: instance in that of man. There are creatures in the world that
have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason.
There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape, but
want reason, and some of them language too.
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