A silent and a striking watch are but one species to
those who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch
for one, and clock for the other, and distinct complex ideas to
which those names belong, to him they are different species. It will
be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is
different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of.
And yet it is plain they are but one species to him, when he has but
one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to
make a new species? There are some watches that are made with four
wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the
workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the
balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others
by hogs' bristles. Are any or all of these enough to make a specific
difference to the workman, that knows each of these and several
other different contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches?
It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest;
but whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates
only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given: as long
as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for, and that
name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under
it, they are not essentially nor specifically different.
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