For the
complex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as
are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put
into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united
together. For, though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself
with colour and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as
necessary to be joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any
one does its fusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as
constantly joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any
other; others put into it ductility or fixedness, &c., as they have
been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all these has
established the right signification of the word, gold? Or who shall be
the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he
appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into
his complex idea signified by the word gold, those qualities, which,
upon trial, he has found united; as another who has not so well
examined has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials,
has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities being
the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can say one of
them has more reason to be put in or left out than another? From hence
it will unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of substances in
men using the same names for them, will be very various, and so the
significations of those names very uncertain.
Pages:
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720