15. Instance, in matter. How much names taken for things are apt
to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical
writers would abundantly discover; and that perhaps in words little
suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a
very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about
matter, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct
from body; as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea
distinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms stood
for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be
put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say, There
is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say, There is one body of
all matters: we familiarly say one body is bigger than another; but it
sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger
than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz. from hence: that, though
matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the
one there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different
conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the
other. For body stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof
matter is but a partial and more confused conception; it seeming to me
to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in
its extension and figure: and therefore it is that, speaking of
matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly
contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is
everywhere the same, everywhere uniform.
Pages:
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743