This being our idea of
matter, we no more conceive or speak of different matters in the world
than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and
speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of
variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and
figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really
existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and
unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads
and books of philosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection
or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I
leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we
should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were
taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for
things themselves. For, when we argue about matter, or any the like
term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound,
whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in
nature or no. And if men would tell what ideas they make their words
stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in
the search or support of truth that there is.
16. This makes errors lasting. But whatever inconvenience follows
from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and
familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of
things.
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