But a man, not
knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connexion in his
mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but
only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus, when we say that animal
rationale is, and animal implume bipes latis unguibus is not a good
definition of a man; it is plain we suppose the name man in this
case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify
that "a rational animal" better described that real essence than "a
two-legged animal with broad nails, and without feathers." For else,
why might not Plato as properly make the word anthropos, or man, stand
for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body, distinguished
from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as
Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave the name anthropos,
or man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless
the name anthropos, or man, were supposed to stand for something
else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some
other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it?
18. V.g. Putting them for the real essences of substances. It is
true the names of substances would be much more useful, and
propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of
substances the ideas in our minds which those words signified.
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