g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; though in
discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.
20. The cause of this abuse, a supposition of nature's working
always regularly, in setting boundaries to species. That which I think
very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences
of species, is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works
regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each
of those species, by giving exactly the same real internal
constitution to each individual which we rank under one general
name. Whereas anyone who observes their different qualities can hardly
doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are,
in their internal constitution, as different one from another as
several of those which are ranked under different specific names. This
supposition, however, that the same precise and internal
constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men
forward to take those names for the representatives of those real
essences; though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas
they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say,
signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of
another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of
uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those who have
thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms, whereby they
firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and
distinguished.
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