21. This abuse contains two false suppositions. But however
preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for ideas we
have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not, it being in
effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is evident to
any one who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their
words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether
this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous
foetus, be a man or no; it is evident the question is not, Whether
that particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the
name man: but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of
things which he supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of
using the names of substances, there are these false suppositions
contained:-
First, that there are certain precise essences according to which
nature makes all particular things, and by which they are
distinguished into species. That everything has a real constitution,
whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities
depend, is past doubt: but I think it has been proved that this
makes not the distinction of species as we rank them, nor the
boundaries of their names.
Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had ideas of
these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it, to inquire
whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species man,
if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known?
Which yet is utterly false.
Pages:
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750