But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries.
Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And
though men will not be so importunately dull as not to understand what
others say, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so
troublesomely critical as to correct others in the use of the words
they receive from them: yet, where truth and knowledge are concerned
in the case, I know not what fault it can be, to desire the
explication of words whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be
ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words;
since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being
informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread
so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The
multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the
intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of
words. For though it be generally believed that there is great
diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies
the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the
contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings
one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am
apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon
things, and know what they think, they think all the same: though
perhaps what they would have be different.
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