SEARCH
0-9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Prev | Current Page 760 | Next

Locke, John

"An Essay Concerning Human Understanding"


14. I. In simple ideas, either by synonymous terms, or by showing
examples. First, when a man makes use of the name of any simple
idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be
mistaken, he is obliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the end of
speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it
stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition:
and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one
of these ways left. First, Sometimes the naming the subject wherein
that simple idea is to be found, will make its name to be understood
by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that
name. So to make a countryman understand what feuillemorte colour
signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered
leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of making
known the signification of the name of any simple idea, is by
presenting to his senses that subject which may produce it in his
mind, and make him actually have the idea that word stands for.
15. II. In mixed modes, by definition. Secondly, Mixed modes,
especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such
combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice, and
whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing,
the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of
simple ideas, by any showing: but, in recompense thereof, may be
perfectly and exactly defined.


Pages:
748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772