And though in the
continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there
can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often
as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the
discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy,
sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning
of it; but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it
concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense
he there uses that term.
BOOK IV
Of Knowledge and Probability
Chapter I
Of Knowledge in General
1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas only. Since the mind, in
all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but
its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident
that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of
two ideas. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception
of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of
any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is,
there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy,
guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.
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