For when
we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that
these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the
utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a
triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive,
that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is
inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?
3. This agreement or disagreement may be any of four sorts. But to
understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or
disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four
sorts:
I. Identity, or diversity.
II. Relation.
III. Co-existence, or necessary connexion.
IV. Real existence.
4. Of identity, or diversity in ideas. First, As to the first sort
of agreement or disagreement, viz. identity or diversity. It is the
first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all,
to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each
what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that
one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it
there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct
thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives
each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct
ideas to disagree, i.
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