If he would extend it further,
he must renew his demonstration in another instance, before he could
know it to be true in another like triangle, and so on: by which means
one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions.
Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton certainly knows any
proposition that he now at any time reads in his book to be true;
though he has not in actual view that admirable chain of
intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true.
Such a memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may
be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, when the very
discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of
ideas, is found to surpass most readers' comprehension. But yet it
is evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true,
remembering he once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly
as he knows such a man wounded another, remembering that he saw him
run him through. But because the memory is not always so clear as
actual perception, and does in all men more or less decay in length of
time, this, amongst other differences, is one which shows that
demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we
shall see in the following chapter.
Chapter II
Of the Degrees of our Knowledge
1.
Pages:
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794