It is on this
intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our
knowledge; Which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he
cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man
cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than to know
that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that
two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different and not
precisely the same. He that demands a greater certainty than this,
demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be a
sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on
this intuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I call
demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of
the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and
certainty.
2. II. Demonstrative. The next degree of knowledge is, where the
mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not
immediately. Though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or
disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it
does not always happen, that the mind sees that agreement or
disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is
discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most
gets no further than a probable conjecture.
Pages:
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796