g.
a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of
equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet
have but a very obscure perception of their agreement, and so have but
a very obscure knowledge of it. But ideas which, by reason of their
obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear or
distinct knowledge; because, as far as any ideas are confused, so
far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree.
Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood: he
that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make
propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain.
Chapter III
Of the Extent of Human Knowledge
1. Extent of our knowledge. Knowledge, as has been said, lying in
the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas,
it follows from hence That,
It extends no further than we have ideas. First, we can have
knowledge no further than we have ideas.
2. It extends no further than we can perceive their agreement or
disagreement. Secondly, That we can have no knowledge further than
we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement. Which
perception being: 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing
any two ideas; or, 2.
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