Such are our ideas of substances, which, consisting
of a collection of simple ideas, supposed taken from the works of
nature, may yet vary from them; by having more or different ideas
united in them than are to be found united in the things themselves.
From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do, fail of
being exactly conformable to things themselves.
12. So far as our complex ideas agree with those archetypes
without us, so far our knowledge concerning substances is real. I say,
then, that to have ideas of substances which, by being conformable
to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in
modes, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though
they did never before so exist: v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or
perjury, &c., were as real and true ideas before, as after the
existence of any such fact. But our ideas of substances, being
supposed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, must still
be taken from something that does or has existed: they must not
consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts, without
any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no
inconsistence in such a combination. The reason whereof is, because
we, knowing not what real constitution it is of substances whereon our
simple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union
of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of others there
are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent
in nature, any further than experience and sensible observation reach.
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