Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore,
one of those desiderata which I found great want of.
Chapter V
Of Truth in General
1. What truth is. What is truth? was an inquiry many ages since; and
it being that which all mankind either do, or pretend to search after,
it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it
consists, and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to
observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood.
2. A right joining or separating of signs, i.e. either ideas or
words. Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word,
to signify nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the
Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another. The
joining or separating of signs here meant, is what by another name
we call proposition. So that truth properly belongs only to
propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal;
as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz. ideas and
words.
3. Which make mental or verbal propositions. To form a clear
notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought,
and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very
difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in
treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then the
instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be
barely mental, and become verbal.
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