And therefore truth as well as knowledge
may well come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being
only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement
or disagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether
our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an
existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when
these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are
such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature: which in
substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.
9. Truth and falsehood in general. Truth is the marking down in
words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is
the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas
otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by
sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real.
The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words
stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of
those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.
10. General propositions to be treated of more at large. But because
words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge,
and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in
reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall
more at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained
in propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour
to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being
certain of their real truth or falsehood.
Pages:
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868