I shall begin with general propositions, as those which most
employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths
are most looked after by the mind as those that most enlarge our
knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of
many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge.
11. Moral and metaphysical truth. Besides truth taken in the
strict sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of truths: As, 1.
Moral truth, which is speaking of things according to the persuasion
of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the
reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the
real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have
annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very
beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to
include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular
thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it. But these
considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or
not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to
have mentioned them.
Chapter VI
Of Universal Propositions: their Truth and Certainty
1. Treating of words necessary to knowledge.
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