e. that real
essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all. This being as
impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what
flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found, whilst he has
no idea of the colour of a pansy at an. Or if we could (which is
impossible) certainly know where a real essence, which we know not,
is, v.g. in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is, yet
could we not be sure that this or that quality could with truth be
affirmed of gold; since it is impossible for us to know that this or
that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence
of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that supposed real
essence may be imagined to constitute.
6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances
is to be known. On the other side, the names of substances, when
made use of as they should be, for the ideas men have in their
minds, though they carry a clear and determinate signification with
them, will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions of
whose truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we
are uncertain what things are signified by them, but because the
complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones as
carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy, but with
a very few other ideas.
Pages:
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874