It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of
their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also
to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.
2. Wherein that self-evidence consists. Knowledge, as has been
shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement
of ideas. Now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived
immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any
other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be
so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which,
without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for in all of them he
will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or
disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds
in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the
proposition.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms. This being so,
in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be
peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name
of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is
plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake
equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go
over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I
have above mentioned, viz.
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