identity, relation, coexistence, and real
existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few
propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but
a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are
such.
4. I. As to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally
self-evident. For, First, The immediate perception of the agreement or
disagreement of identity being founded in the mind's having distinct
ideas, this affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have
distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the
foundation of it, various and distinct ideas: and it is the first
act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any
knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish
it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he
has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and
what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them
distinctly and unconfusedly one from another; which always being so,
(it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,)
he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is
there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when
they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea.
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