So
that all such affirmations and negations are made without any
possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily
be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in
our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand
for. And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any
proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms,
and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different;
it is presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a
proposition; and this equally whether these propositions be in terms
standing for more general ideas, or such as are less so: v.g.
whether the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this
proposition, "whatsoever is, is"; or a more particular idea be
affirmed of itself, as "a man is a man"; or, "whatsoever is white is
white"; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of
not-Being, which is the only (if I may so call it) idea different from
it, as in this other proposition, "it is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be": or any idea of any particular being be denied of
another different from it, as "a man is not a horse"; "red is not
blue." The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are
understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible,
and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as
the more general propositions; and all for the same reason, viz.
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