because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to
be the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different,
and not the same; and this it is equally certain of, whether these
ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It is not,
therefore, alone to these two general propositions- "whatsoever is,
is"; and "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"-
that this sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The
perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague
ideas, signified by the terms whatsoever, and thing, than it does to
any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting to no more, in
short, but this, that the same is the same, and the same is not
different, are truths known in more particular instances, as well as
in those general maxims; and known also in particular instances,
before these general maxims are ever thought on; and draw all their
force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular
ideas. There is nothing more visible than that the mind, without the
help of any proof, or reflection on either of these general
propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the
idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea of blue; and that
the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not
absent; that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to
the evidence or certainty of its knowledge.
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