And the ideas first in the mind, it is
evident, are those of particular things, from whence, by slow degrees,
the understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken
from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the
mind, with general names to them. Thus particular ideas are first
received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them; and
next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to
particular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children,
or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to
grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are
made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that
general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry
difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we
are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and
skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of
the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be
neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor
scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is
something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts
of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is
true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and
makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of
communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is
naturally very much inclined.
Pages:
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897