Another sort of trifling propositions is,
when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the
whole; a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all
propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more
comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. For what information,
what knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. "Lead is a metal"
to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All
the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term
metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified
by the name lead. Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of the
word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain
the signification of the word lead, by saying it is a metal, which
at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate
them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible, and
malleable.
5. As part of the definition of the term defined. Alike trifling
it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term
defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one
of the name of the whole complex idea; as, "All gold is fusible."
For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making
up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but
playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is
comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little
better than ridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that
gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say
it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of
which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech.
Pages:
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923