What
instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath
been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed
to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he
is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold stands for this
complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not
much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and
gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve
to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the definition of his
own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge
with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be.
6. Instance, man and palfrey. "Every man is an animal, or living
body," is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to
the knowledge of things than to say, a palfrey is an ambling horse, or
a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the signification of
words, and make me know but this- That body, sense, and motion, or
power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I
always comprehend and signify by the word man: and where they are
not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing:
and so of the other- That body, sense, and a certain way of going,
with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always
comprehend and signify by the word palfrey; and when they are not to
be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing.
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