7. For this teaches but the signification of words. Before a man
makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he
uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by
imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of
others; but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of
ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to
understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks
jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles
with words who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made,
contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was
supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle hath three sides, or
saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable than where a man
goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself
not to understand him; and then it teaches only the signification of
that word, and the use of that sign.
8. But adds no real knowledge. We can know then the truth of two
sorts of propositions with perfect certainty. The one is, of those
trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a
verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know
the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm
something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its
precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external
angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite
internal angles.
Pages:
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926