This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save
us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much
shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true
knowledge.
Chapter IX
Of our Threefold Knowledge of Existence
1. General propositions that are certain concern not existence.
Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things; which being
only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from
particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in
abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what
it has in the understanding,) gives us no knowledge of real
existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that
universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain
knowledge concern not existence: and further, that all particular
affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were
made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the
accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which,
in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or
repugnancy.
2. A threefold knowledge of existence. But, leaving the nature of
propositions, and different ways of predication to be considered
more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire
concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, and how we come
by it.
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