We are not, then, to put
others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal
certainty in all those matters; wherein we are not capable of any
other knowledge, but what our senses give us in this or that
particular.
13. Only particular propositions concerning concrete existences
are knowable. By which it appears that there are two sorts of
propositions:- (1) There is one sort of propositions concerning the
existence of anything answerable to such an idea: as having the idea
of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first
and natural inquiry is, Whether such a thing does anywhere exist?
And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of anything
without us, but only of God, can certainly be known further than our
senses inform us. (2) There is another sort of propositions, wherein
is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas,
and their dependence on one another. Such propositions may be
universal and certain. So, having the idea of God and myself, of
fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared
and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain, concerning man
in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a species, whereof
I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how certain soever,
that "men ought to fear and obey God" proves not to me the existence
of men in the world; but will be true of all such creatures,
whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general propositions
depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those
abstract ideas.
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