5. To do so is no certain way to truth. If, therefore, those that
pass for principles are not certain, (which we must have some way to
know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are
doubtful,) but are only made so to us by our blind assent, we are
liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided into truth,
we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake and error.
6. But to compare clear, complete ideas, under steady names. But
since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as of
all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the
agreement or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our
knowledge is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to
receive and swallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our
minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas, as far as they are to be
had, and annex to them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps,
without any other principles, but barely considering those perfect
ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement
and disagreement, and their several relations and habitudes; we
shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one
rule than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds
into the disposal of others.
7. The true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our
abstract ideas.
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