But my
meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which
the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of things, and
have principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) till we have very well
examined particulars, and made several experiments, in that thing
which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will
agree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite through,
and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seem
to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care
that the name of principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by
making us receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at
best but a very doubtful conjecture; such as are most (I had almost
said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy.
14. Clear and distinct ideas with settled names, and the finding
of those intermediate ideas which show their agreement or
disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge. But whether
natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways to
enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short,
to be these two:-
First, The first is to get and settle in our minds determined
ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names; at
least, so many of them as we would consider and improve our
knowledge in, or reason about.
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